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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ROBERT K. DUSENBERRY and
EDITH 'C. DUSENBERRY, his wife,
Plaintiffs, and Appellants,

vs.

CASE
NO. 8712

TAYLOR'S, a corporation,

Defendant and Res:pondoot.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prior to 1954, Mr. and Mrs. G. L. Miller had purchased
numerous items on open account credit at Taylor's Inc., a
Provo, Ultah, department store, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). In
July, 1954, Mr. G. L. Miller purchased wall to wall carpeting, pad, tile, and linoleum to be installed in a new home
and on July 9, 1954, the carpeting and pad and the labor
charges for installing were charged out to G. L. Miller on
open account. Credit was approved for Taylor's Inc., by
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one who initialed the charge slip by the letters "pm",
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9). On July 26, 1954, the Millers pUTchased a crib, playpen and mattress, and on that day they
paid $10.00 on their aocount. On August 30, they paid
$23.00, which was duly credited to the accounts receivable
ledger, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). During the months of July
and August, 1954, they also purchased numerous items of
furniture, consisting of bedroom set, lamps, breakfast set,
bedroom screen, sofa and chair covers, and also had the
linoleum and tile laid upon the floor of their horne. All of
these items were charged to G. L. Miller on open account,
and are listed on the accounts receivable ledger, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). On August 31, 1954, a payment of $300.00
was credited to the open account, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1).
On September 1, 1954, they purchased a 'bedspread, and it
w.as charged to "G. L. Miller" and again credit was approved by "P.M." and it was charged on the open account,
(Page 2 of Defendant's Exhibit 8 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit
1).

It was the practice of Taylor's Inc., to mark the charge
slips with the word '',Contract'' if the charge was to be
other than on open account, (Tr. 25). None of the above
mentioned sales were so stamped or marked, (Exhibits
P-9 ·and Page 2 of D-8). Mr. G. L. Miller had been interviewed for ·credit on or about July 10, 1954, by "P.M.", (Defendant's Exhibit 7).
After September 1, ··and prior to September 9, 1954,
the Milers purchased drapes from Taylor's Inc. These
items were marked "Contract" and credit was not approved by "P.M.", (Defendant's Exhibit 8, Pages 1, 3 and
4) '' and on septembe·r 9th, 1954, the drapery items were
charged to a riotes receivable account, (Page 2., PlaintiffS'
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Exhibit 1). Also, on September 9, .1954, an entry was made
on the accounts receivable ledger, "Trans to Note $1,962.78"
and the open account was thereby balanced as of that date,
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). At the same time an entry was
made on the notes receivable ledger, "Trans from acct.
$1,962.78". (Page 2, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). On that same
date Taylor's Inc., secured a promissory norte in the amournt
of $2,685.71, including finance charges of $132.21 and which
said note also indicated that the sum of $2,553.50 was ''trans.
acct.", Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-2). Although all of the charges had been to "G. L. Miller", (Defendant's Exhibit 8 and
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9) , the note was signed only by "Eva
K. Miller", (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). On the everse side of
the note, among other conditions, it was recited, "1. Title
to the property ·mentioned herein shall remain in Taylor's
until the purchaser pays this note in full and complies with
all other ·conditions to be performed by him."

In the month of July, 1955, the plaintiffs, Major Robert
K. Dusenberry, United States Air Force, and his wife, Edith
C. Dusenberry, were seeking a home in the Provo area.
Under date of July 25, 1955, they received a letter from
Mrs. G. L. Miller offering to sell the Miller home and reciting among other things that "The home could be available
for you by August 15," and that "It is carpeted and draped",
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5). On August 30, 1955, they obtained
a warranty deed from Eva K. Miller, (P-3) and on that
same date gave a mortgage on the property to State Savings & Loan Association for $12,500.00, (Plaintiffs' Ex.rubit

4>.

Mrs. Dusenberry and her children lived in the home
from that time until the 15th day of September, 1956, when
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she and her husband leased the home to Mr. and Mrs. John
W. Manning and gave the Mannings an option to purchase
the property, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6) .
Mr. and Mrs. Dusenberry did not acquire any furniture from Eva K. Miller, and at the time they took possession orf the property part of the drapes had been removed.
Never at any time while the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Dusenberry, occupied the premises did they know that the defendant, Taylor's Inc., claimed title to the carpeting, linoleum, tile or drapes, (Tr. 4). Sometime after Mr. and
Mrs. Manning took possession of the property a representative of Taylor's Inc., called at the home and told Mrs.
Manning that the carpeting, linoleum and tile on the floors
and the drapes belonged to the Company, (Tr. 26). Taylor's Inc., first manifested an alleged title to these items
only after they had learned that Mr. G. L. Miller had taken
out· bankruptcy in the state of California, (Tr. 33). Mr.
Miller had gone to California prior to the time that Mrs.
Miller offered to sell the house· to the plaintiffs.
After the plaintiffs leased the premises to Mr. and Mrs.
Manning they moved to the state of Texas, where Mr. Dusenberry was ~and is on active duty with the U. S. Air Force.
After plaintiffs learned of the defendant's claim they filed
a suit for a Declaratory Judgment against the defendant,
Taylor's Inc. .
The case was· heard by the Honorable Maurice Harding in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County,
and :this appeal is from his Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment, entered in favor of the defendant.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND HOLDING
THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING, TILE AND LINOLEUM WAS STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THE ALLEGEJD CONDITIO·NAL SALES CONTRACT
IS IN.VALID AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
POINT III
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFFS, AS PURCHASERS OF THE REALTY WITHO~UT NOTICE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CUAIM TO FIXTURES, ARE UNAFFECTED BY THJE DEFEND\ANT'S CLAIM OF TITLE
THERETO.
POINT IV
RUSSELL v. HARKNESS IS NOT AUTHORITY ON
THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE.
THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND H01LDING
THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING, TILE AND LINOLEUM WAS STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT.

The ledger sheet shows a series of open account transactions consisting of charges and credits extending from
October 27, 1951, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That account,
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in the name of Mrs. G. L. Miller, was balanced by an entry
"Trans. to note" on August 31, 1953, (P-1). In July of
1954, a earpeting job amounting to $1,267.32 was charged
out to G. L. Miller, credit was approved by "P'M.", (P-9)
and that amount was entered on the accounts reseivable
ledger, (P-1). On that same day a credit of $300.00 was
also entered, (P-1). All of the items involved in these transactions ·had been charged out to G. L. Miller, (Exhibits D-8
and P-9); ;however, Mr. G. L. Miller did not sign the contract upon which defendant relies, (Exhibit P-2.
The foregoing clearly shows that title passed from the
defendant to G. L. Miller, and that defendant, by the devise
of the alleged title retaining note later obtained from Eva
K. Miller, attempted to regain title for its own security. At
most, such a contract could amount only to an instrument
in the nature of a chattel mortgage, which was required
to be filed of record before it became binding on an innocent purchaser for value. An absolute sale may not subsequently be converted into a conditional sale by the written agreement of the parties without change of possession,
at least where it would be to the prejudice of a subsequent
purchaser of the vendee without notice of the agreement.
Van Winkle v. Crowell, 146 U. S. 42, 13 S. Ct. 18.
The chief criterion for determining the character of
the transaction is the intention of the parties as disclosed
by the entire contract, the circumstances attending the
transaction, and the conduct of the parties. 47 Am. Jur 17.
w·hile defendant did not see fit to introduce all of the sales
slips for the various items entered on the accounts receivable ledger, the one that was introduced, being the $1,267.00 carpet item, shows a simple charge to G. L. Miller
on the 9th day of July, 1954, with credit approved for the
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company by "P.M.", (P-9). Defendant's witness, Mr. Steedman, stated that his company made a distinction between
sales to be made on open accorunt and those to be put on
a contract, and that sales to be put on contract were stamped
"contract"., (Tr. 24-25). None of the sales made prior
to September 3, 1954, were so stan1ped, (Page 2 of D-8 and
P-9) , and all of these items were posted to the accounts receivable ledger, (P-1). Sales made on and after September 3, 19·54, appear to have been stamped "contract", (Pages
1, 3 and 4 of D-8), and were posted to the notes receivable
ledger. On September 9, 1954, the balance owing on the
open account was transferred to the note ledger, (Page 2
of P-1), and on the same date that the norte was executed,
(P-2).

All of the charges were made to G. L. Miller, (D-8 and
P-9), and G. L~. Miller \Vas the person named as credit applicant, (D-7). G. L. Miller, however, did not sign the note,
(P-2).

Where property was delivered to purchaser, and there
was no previous contract retaining title in seller, the fact
that the delivery slip contained the words "conditional sale,
title retained by vendor until paid in full" was held nort sufficient to shO'W' a conditional sale. Utah Association of
Credit Men v. BuDer, 57 Utah 270, 194 Pac. 127.
The devise of a conditional sale contract has severe
remedial incidents, and is not favored in the law. ·Such a
contract must be elearly proved, and the courts tend to
resolve doubts as to whether a transaction is a conditional
sale or chattel mortgage in favor of the latter construction.
47 Am. Jur. 6, Paragraph 827.
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POINT II
THE ALLEGED CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT

IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTO·RY REQUIREMENTS.
The laws of the State of Utah with respect to conditional sales were amended in 1953, to require, among other
things, that every conditional sales contract for the time
sale of tangible personal property, be signed by both the
buyer and the seller. 15-1-2a (10-b), U. C. A. 1953, as
amended by Chapter 24, Paragraph 2, Laws of Utah, 1953.
The contract here considered is not signed by either G. L.
Miller or the seller and, therefore, does not even purport
to meet the statutory requirement. The requirments of
such statute are mandatory, and compliance therewith is
indispensable. 47 Am. Jur. 40, and authorities there cited.
POINT ill
THE RIGHT O·F THE PLAINTIFFS, AS PURCHASERS O·F THE REALTY WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM TO FIXTURES, ARE UNAFFECTED BY TH1E DE·FENDANT'S CLAIM OF TITLE
THERETO.
It was well known to the defendant at the time it sold
and installed the linoleum, tile and wall-to-wall carpeting
involved in this ~case that it would be permanently attached
to the house, and that upon a resale it would pass as a part
of the real estate. The conditional vendor of chattels attached to realty has repeatedly been held to be without
right of recovery of the fixtures~ as against a subsequent
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purchaser of the realty without notice of the existence of
the conditional sale. Annotation 141 ALR 1284.
POINT IV
RUSSELL v. HARKNESS IS NOT AUTHORITY O·N
THJE F ACfS OF THE PRESENT ·CASE.

The Uta:h ·case, Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 Pac.
865 Aff'd 118 U. S. 663, cited by the defendant and reHed
upon by the trial court, is entirely different ~rom the in·stant case. In that case the seller was the owner of ,and
had possession of the equipment at the time the eonditional
sale agreement ·was executed. The vendee took possession
after the a~eement was made. In addition, the purchaser
from the conditional vendee, at the time of purchase, knew
that the equipment had not been paid for and knew that
the conditional vendor claimed title thereto. It was not a
situation where a sale on open account was later changed
to a conditional sale without redelivery of possession to the
vendor, as in the instant case.
CONCLUSION

The Trial Court erred in ·holding that title to the items
in question was vested in defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH & BULLOCK
35 No. Utniv. Ave.

Provo, Uta:h
Attorneys for Appellants
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